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Abstract 
The Internet enables individuals to speak anonymously with unprecedented ease. As a 
result there has been a global increase of anonymous online speakers which raises 
unique legal regulatory challenges. For the purpose of ensuring anonymous online 
speakers are held accountable for harmful speech, the Harmful Digital 
Communications Act 2015 in New Zealand introduces a remedial measure which 
empowers the District Court to order the disclosure of an anonymous online user’s 
identity. This paper seeks to draw attention to issues concerning an individual’s use of 
anonymity online to exercise their right to freedom of expression. The paper concludes 
by providing recommendations on how the courts can effectively balance this right 
against the principle of accountability which guides the disclosure orders in a manner 
which is compliant with the Bill of Rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words 
Anonymity; digital communication; Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015; 
freedom of expression; accountability 
  
  
 
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
I Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
II The Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 ...................................................... 3 
 A Purpose and procedure ...................................................................... 3 
 B The Place of Freedom of Expression................................................. 5 
III Policy justifications for online anonymous speech regulation ................................. 8 
 A Rationales for protection.................................................................... 9 
 B Rationales for restriction ................................................................. 14 
IV Informative experiences in anonymous speech regulation ..................................... 16 
 A The United Kingdom: Norwich Pharmacal Orders ...................... 16 
 B New Zealand: Journalist Source Protection .................................. 20 
 C The United States: John Doe Subpoenas ........................................ 22 
 1    A balanced standard .................................................................................... 23 
 2    Lessons for New Zealand ........................................................................... 26 
V Recommendations for a comprehensive legal approach: striking a balance........ 28 
VI Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 31 
VII Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 33 
  
 
1 
 
  
I Introduction 
 
Anonymity has been defined as a “shield from the tyranny of the majority”.1 In the 
context of current digital communication practices with an associated unprecedented ease 
of concealing identity, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of speakers using 
the ‘shield’ of anonymity online.2 In addition there has been a parallel significant rise in 
the number of speakers using anonymity to avoid accountability for the effects of their 
speech.3 A widely observed tendency of anonymity online to encourage harmful digital 
communication is an international concern, and strategic restrictions on the capacity of 
individuals to hide their identity are being employed by governments and online content 
hosts alike with the general aim to reduce abusive communications online and uphold 
individual accountability.4  In recent decades, the Internet has arguably become the 
central mode of communication for societies worldwide and the need for a regulatory 
framework is increasingly necessary.5 In balance, the Internet is also widely valued as a 
forum for free speech in which anonymity plays a key role in fostering the exercise of an 
individual’s right to freedom of expression online in meaningful ways.6 As a result, legal 
mechanisms undertaken to discover the identities of anonymous online speakers 
encounter a fundamental tension between the principle of personal accountability for 
one’s actions and the right to free speech. 
 
  
1 McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission 514 U.S. 334 (1995) at 357.  
2 Cabinet Social Policy Committee “Harmful digital communications: Cabinet social policy committee 
paper” at 10.5. 
3 Law Commission The News Media Meets ‘New Media’: Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation in the 
Digital Age (NZLC IP27, 2011) at 7.5. 
4 Danielle Keats Citron Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Harvard University Press, United States, 2014) at 238.  
5 Brian Murchison “Anonymous Speech on the Internet” in Dan Hunter, Ramon Lobato, Megan Richardson 
and Julian Thomas (eds) Amateur Media: social, cultural and legal perspectives (Routledge, New York, 
2013) at 187.  
6 R. Campbell, C.R. Martin, B. Fabos Media and culture: mass communication in a digital age (9th ed) 
(Boston & New York, Bedford/St. Martins, 2014) at 570. 
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The Courts in New Zealand will encounter this legal challenge around the disclosure of 
the identity of anonymous online speakers when the recently enacted Harmful Digital 
Communications Act 2015 (HDCA) comes into effect. A remedial measure included in 
the Act empowers the District Court to order the disclosure of an anonymous online 
user’s identity in circumstances where the user has engaged with harmful digital 
communications.7 The Act is New Zealand’s statutory initiative to combat abusive 
behavior online and is intended to specifically respond to unique characteristics of digital 
communication that foster abuse.8 The capacity to be anonymous has been identified as 
one such characteristic due to its tendency to shelter speakers from the consequences of 
their actions.9 In order to hold individuals accountable for abusive speech, the Act 
includes a remedial measure which empowers the District Court to order an online 
content host or Internet Protocol Address Provider (IPAP) to release the identity of an 
anonymous account user.  
 
When making such disclosure orders, the Court is required to act consistently with the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 including the 
right to freedom of expression in s 14.10  This paper argues that due to the breadth of 
types of communication encapsulated by the HDCA and the likelihood in the current 
digital environment of an increase in applications for disclosure of the identifying details 
of anonymous speakers, such applications before the Court will involve individuals and 
groups whose speech upholds fundamental rationales of freedom of expression. In these 
circumstances the Court will be required to determine which legal interest outweighs the 
other - the rationale of individual accountability versus the individual’s right to freedom 
of expression. As these types of orders are unprecedented in New Zealand, this paper 
draws on analogous areas of law and overseas experience to recommend considerations 
the Court should take into account in the balancing exercise required to determine 
  
7 Sections 19 (2) (b) and (3) - the Act has adopted the same meaning of an IPAP as is used in section 122A 
(1) of the Copyright Act 1994. It is an entity that provides internet access to users and allocates internet 
protocol (IP addresses. 
8 (25 June 2015) 706 NZPD 4830. 
9 Law Commission, above n 3, at 7.4. 
10 Harmful Digital Communications Act, s 19 (6).  
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whether and to what extent the type of anonymous online speech being dealt with 
deserves protection. 
 
Section II discusses the policy motivations behind the statutory power to order the 
disclosure of an anonymous online speaker under the HDCA and considers the role of s 
14 of the Bill of Rights. Section III discusses the rationales for protective and restrictive 
approaches towards the regulation of anonymous online speech. Section IV considers the 
extent to which balancing exercises have been engaged with in pre-existing legal 
approaches towards the disclosure of anonymous speaker’s identities within New 
Zealand and overseas. Drawing together observations in the previous sections, Section V 
proposes that a court should consider anonymous online speech as protected by s 14 of 
the Bill of Rights and conduct a contextual analysis to determine whether it is outweighed 
by a legal interest in disclosure. 
 
II The Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 
A Purpose and procedure 
 
The Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 creates a civil enforcement regime 
intended to deter, prevent and mitigate harm caused to individuals by digital 
communication and provide victims of such communication with efficient and effective 
forms of redress.11 The Act developed out of a review conducted by the Law Commission 
in 2012 on the regulation of new media in New Zealand called “Regulatory Gaps and the 
New Media”. This review concluded that existing civil and criminal remedies were 
insufficient to address new forms of harmful digital communications.12 The capacity to 
be anonymous was identified by the Commission in its Ministerial Briefing Paper as a 
critical feature which distinguishes digital communications from offline 
  
11 Section 3.  
12 Law Commission, above n 3, at terms of reference. 
  
 
4 
 
communication.13 In response to this review, the HDCA is intended to specifically target 
unique characteristics of digital communication. 14 In particular, the rapid dissemination 
of information to a global audience, the permanence of information online and the ability 
to be anonymous. 15 
 
The procedural measures introduced in the HDCA are intended to fill this perceived 
regulatory gap. 16 Under s 19 the District Court is empowered to make a number of orders 
including an order to an online content host or IPAP to release the identity of the author 
of an anonymous or pseudonymous communication.17 Many online content hosts 
expressly state in their conditions of service or privacy policies that identifying 
information about registered users will not be released without a government condoned 
order.18 An order under s 19 may be made if there has been a breach of one or more of 
the “communication principles” specified in s 6 and the breach is likely to have caused 
harm to a person.19 A broad multi-factor discretion is further conferred on the Courts for 
making an order under s 19 (5).  In addition an order must be consistent with the rights 
and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights.20  
 
Formal discussions around the development of the Act have been largely confined to the 
propensity of anonymity to exacerbate abusive communications, however this is a very 
limited aspect of the broader issues and values around anonymity in this context.21 In the 
  
13 Law Commission Harmful Digital Communications: the adequacy of the current sanctions and remedies 
(NZLC MB3, 2012) at 10.  
14 Ministry of Justice Regulatory Impact Statement: Harmful Digital Communications (November 2013) in 
Objectives.  
15 (25 June 2015) 706 NZPD 4830. 
16 Ministry of Justice, above n 14, at 18.1. 
17 An online content host is defined in s 4 of the HDCA as “the person who has control over the part of the 
electronic retrieval system, such as a website or an online application, on which the communication is posted 
and accessible by the user”. 
18 In Irwin Toy Ltd v Doe [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 the ISP refused to disclose the identity of one of their 
subscribers to a plaintiff without an application for a court order.  
19 Section 6 (2). 
20 Section 19 (6).  
21 Law Commission, above n 13, at 2.42. 
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Third Reading of the Act, the Honourable Amy Adams (Minister of Justice) identified 
anonymity as a feature of the Internet allowing bullying to dramatically extend its reach 
and impact, but no further issues around anonymity were discussed.22 As the Ministry of 
Justice notes however, the communication principles are very broad encompassing 
communications such as false allegations and the disclosure of sensitive personal 
information.23 The Law Commission expressed a concern to ensure that provisions in the 
HDCA which restrict communications are articulated widely enough to fulfil the 
legislation’s purpose of mitigating harmful digital engagement.24 The Law Commission 
acknowledges that as a result not all speech abuses online, even if offensive, would meet 
the threshold of an offence under the Act.25 Empowering the District Court to order the 
disclosure of the identity of the author of an anonymous digital communication is 
intended to provide a remedy for victims of its harmful use, not to constrain anonymous 
speech as a whole.26 The narrow rhetorical focus on anonymity causing harm however 
neglects consideration of broader issues concerning the importance of anonymity for 
freedom of expression which will be implicated by the application of the Act. 
 
B The Place of Freedom of Expression 
 
Section 19 (6) of the HDCA requires the Court to take into account the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights when making an order to disclose the identity 
of an anonymous online speaker.27 This includes the right to freedom of expression under 
s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 which establishes that: 28 
 
  
22 (25 June 2015) 706 NZPD 4830. 
23 Ministry of Justice Legal Advice: Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Harmful 
Digital Communications Bill (1 November 2013) at 19.1. 
24 Law Commission, above n 3, at 62.  
25 Law Commission, above n 3, at 7.60. 
26 Law Commission, above n 3, at 7.6. 
27 Harmful Digital Communications Act, s 19 (6). 
28 Section 14. 
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Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive 
and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
 
The Court is required to interpret legislation in light of the importance of freedom of 
expression however the Bill of Rights does not confer absolute protection on the rights 
and freedoms it contains.29 This is recognized in section 5 of the Bill of Rights which 
allows for limitations on rights and freedoms if it is demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.30 Speech is therefore valued by the law according to a hierarchy.31 
The highest importance is attributed to speech which meaningfully contributes to public 
discourse such as political speech whereas personal abuse and harassment are considered 
to abuse the privilege thereby forfeiting protection.32 The level of protection the courts 
will afford therefore depends on the type of speech in a particular circumstance.  
 
The Law Commission recommended a legal framework which presumes that a vital role 
is played by digital communications in a healthy democracy.33 The HDCA aims to strike 
a balance between the societal interest of preventing harm and preserving the right to 
freedom of expression.34 The Ministry of Justice acknowledges an order to disclose an 
anonymous user’s identity is an indirect constraint on digital communications therefore 
a limit on the right to freedom of expression.35 The Ministry of Justice however 
concluded in advice provided to the Attorney-General on the consistency of the Act with 
the Bill of Rights that this was a justified restriction.36 This conclusion was based on the 
requirements that an order to disclose an anonymous online author’s identity can be made 
only when the communication meets the threshold of serious emotional harm and has 
  
29 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 4.  
30 Section 5.  
31 Law Commission, above n 13, at 23.  
32 Law Commission, above n 13, at 23. 
33 Law Commission, above n 3, at 6. 
34 Law Commission, above n 13, at 21. 
35 Ministry of Justice Legal Advice: Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Harmful 
Digital Communications Bill (1 November 2013) at 13.1. 
36 At 2.3.3 – the Attorney-General is required by s 7 of the Bill of Rights to report on any inconsistency. 
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breached one of the communication principles.37 A decision under s 7 on the consistency 
of legislation with the Bill of Rights is not however conclusive and the District Court will 
still face the question of whether a disclosure order creates minimal interference on the 
right to freedom of expression.38 
 
The judicial assessment of whether a limitation on freedom of expression is demonstrably 
justified rests upon balancing individual rights against the policy rationale for their 
restriction.39 In the context of a disclosure order under s 19 of the HDCA, the Court will 
need to consider whether the societal interest of accountability for harm outweighs an 
individual’s right to freedom of expression. A limitation on an individual’s right to 
freedom of expression under the HDCA in order to prevent engagement in expressive 
activities for the purposes of harm is not difficult to justify.40 The disclosure of an 
anonymous user’s identity is rationally connected to this purpose as it deters harm by 
holding individual’s accountable for their actions or at least creating the threat of doing 
so. The ‘safe harbor’ provision for online content hosts included in the HDCA is partially 
intended to encourage individual authors of online content to take personal responsibility 
for the content and any consequences it has incurred.41 Accountability, rather than 
censorship, is the guiding principle for identity disclosure under the HDCA.42 A 
disclosure order is intended to promote personal responsibility and fairness.43  
 
The task faced by the Courts is in establishing boundaries around the extent to which an 
order to disclose an anonymous online speaker’s identity can interfere with the right to 
  
37 At 14.  
38 Grant Huscroft “The Attorney-General’s Reporting Duty” in Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott 
Optican and Richard Mahoney (eds) The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) 
at 201.  
39 R v Hansen [2007] SC 2007, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 as per Tipping J at [117]. 
40 Grant Huscroft “Reasonable Limits on Rights” in Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican and 
Richard Mahoney (eds) The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) at 172. 
41 (25 June 2015) 706 NZPD 4830. 
42 Law Commission, above n 3, at 37. 
43 (25 June 2015) 706 NZPD 4830. 
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freedom of expression and this is unprecedented in New Zealand.44 The right to freedom 
of expression is one of the most important rights in the Bill of Rights and has been given 
substantial weight by case law in both New Zealand and the United Kingdom. 45 The 
court should adopt a stringent approach when considering if it should be overridden. As 
Tipping J observed in R v Hansen “it is instructive and appropriate that our society should 
be described as both free and democratic”. 46 The law needs to ensure anonymous 
speakers of simply controversial messages are not unmasked, as highlighted by digital 
social media site Facebook in its submissions on the HDCA.47 The balancing exercise 
required by s 5 of the Bill of Rights should therefore ensure that orders to disclose an 
online speaker’s identity do not curtail valuable anonymous speech. 
 
III Policy justifications for online anonymous speech regulation  
 
Anonymity has been identified by the Law Commission as one of the “fundamental 
human constructs”, alongside privacy, identity and security, that has been impacted by 
the Internet and forcing society to reconsider their implications.48 Limitations around free 
speech established by the law reflect core values held by society.49 Legal academic 
Andrew Geddis describes expression as a “social practice” and the boundaries around 
what a society will tolerate change over time in tandem with shifts in social values.50 The 
law should therefore endeavor to reflect the value of anonymity in a contemporary digital 
environment. 
 
 
  
44 Wainwright v Police [1968] NZLR 101 (SC) as per McCarthy J. 
45 Police v Campbell [2010] 1 NZLR 483 (HC). 
46 R v Hansen, above n 39, as per Tipping J at [101]. 
47 Facebook “Submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the Harmful Digital Communications 
Bill 2014”, at 15.  
48 Law Commission, above n 3, at 1.16. 
49 Law Commission, above n 13, at 22.  
50 Andrew Geddis “The State of Freedom of Expression in New Zealand: an admittedly eclectic overview” 
(2008) 11 Otago Law Review 4 at 559. 
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A Rationales for protection 
 
Free speech values are an inherent part of the Internet’s architecture reflected in features 
of its design which explicitly foster open discussion and participation.51 Anonymity on 
the Internet has been widely identified as a mechanism which enables an individual to 
realise their right to freedom of expression. Although anonymity is not addressed in the 
Universal Declaration or in article 19 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, however the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner said in a 
report released in May 2015 “anonymity…provide[s] the privacy and security necessary 
for the exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age”.52 In 
the United States, the Supreme Court’s ruling that the First Amendment protects speech 
on the Internet has been extended to circumstances involving anonymous online speakers 
in the context of court orders for disclosure.53 The Supreme Court of Canada has 
exercised a cautious approach to the disclosure of anonymous online speaker’s identities 
on the basis of preventing any unnecessary curtailment of anonymous free speech.54 The 
European Court of Human Rights has also recognized online anonymity as important for 
the exercise of the right to freedom of expression.55 The right to freedom of expression 
has been considered in relation to speech on the Internet by the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal.56 This paper contends the scope of protection afforded by s 14 should similarly 
extend to anonymous online speech. 
 
Anonymous online speech attract legal protection by the extent to which it upholds free 
speech rationales. The importance of freedom of expression in modern society has been 
  
51 Law Commission, above n 3, at 7.3. 
52 David Kaye Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression A/HRC/29/32 (2015) at [56].  
53 Doe v Cahill, 884 A.2d 4451, 457-58 and Doe v 2TheMart.com Inc 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091-92 (W.D. 
Wash. 2001). 
54 R v Spencer 2014 SCC 43 – in this case struck down the acquisition of an anonymous internet user’s 
identity without a warrant. 
55 In Financial Times Ltd v United Kingdom (Application No 821/03, 15 December 2009). 
56 Murray v Wishart [2014] 3 NZLR 722 at [141]. 
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traditionally justified by a dominant theory called the ‘marketplace of ideas’. This 
concept was first articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of the US Supreme Court 
in 1919 who stated the “best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted 
in the competition of the market”. 57 The theory describes a metaphorical sphere of public 
discourse free from government interference within which freedom of expression is a 
process for identifying the truth.58 The ‘marketplace of ideas’ theory builds from the 
long-standing notion that protecting freedom of expression advances discovery and 
acceptance of the truth.59 This concept is frequently attributed to John Stuart Mill who 
posited that open debate and strong argument is the best protection against prejudice.60 
 
Anonymous speech was found to be a constitutional right under the First Amendment by 
the US Supreme Court on the grounds that anonymity encourages speakers to contribute 
valuable information to the marketplace of ideas. 61 The Court noted that without the 
ability to be anonymous public discourse would suffer due to individuals refraining from 
speaking out of fear of social ostracism or a desire to maintain privacy.62 Anonymous 
internet speech further broadens the democratic potential of the marketplace of ideas 
online by enhancing the value of the content of speech through removing associations 
with identity.63 This removal of value placed on authorship has also been recognized by 
jurisprudence in the United States to uphold the truth-seeking value. 64 The Internet 
generally facilitates the discovery of truth by expanding access to objective information 
for a wider audience.65  
  
57 Abrams v United States, 260 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes J dissenting). 
58 Andrew Nicol, Gavin Millar and Andrew Sharland Media Law and Human Rights (2nd ed) (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 3.  
59 Nicol, Millar and Sharland, above n 58, at 3. 
60 Murchison, above n 5, at 195. 
61 McIntyre, above n 1, at 341. 
62 At 342. 
63 Murchison, above n 5, at 193. 
64 Doe v Cahill, above n 53. 
65 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, above n 52, at 7; Lyrissa Lidsky, “Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace” 
(2000) 49 Duke Law Journal 855 at 894. 
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The achievement of democratic self-government is another major theoretical basis for 
protecting freedom of expression, for which open discourse achieved through a 
marketplace of ideas and the discovery of truth are seen as essential preconditions.66 
There are strong reasons for protecting anonymity in this context. An obvious example 
is the fundamental criterion that citizens in a democratic election vote anonymously for 
a free and fair government. The Supreme Court of the United States has adopted a 
protective stance on anonymity when dealing with anonymous speech used for the 
purposes of political commentary.67 Avoiding identification is also essential in activism 
and governmental whistleblowing to prevent harmful repercussions.68 Digital activism 
has become a prominent feature of Internet discourse, much of which is aided by 
anonymity. A prominent and influential example is WikiLeaks which claims in its 
mission statement to disseminate important news to the public by providing a secure 
forum for sources to anonymously leak information.69 In countries where journalists and 
activists are persecuted, anonymous Twitter feeds and blogs are relied upon to 
disseminate information in the public interest such as exposing corrupt political practices 
of state officials.70 Anonymity therefore advances the democratic social goal of 
meaningful participation in democracy by including voices that may not otherwise be 
heard.  
 
Freedom of expression is frequently posited as an important means of securing individual 
liberty.71 The Internet has become a key means for individuals to achieve self-expression 
  
66 Lidsky, above n 65, at 894. 
67 McIntyre, above n 1; in an online context Doe v Cahill, above n 53. 
68 Nathaniel Gleicher “John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard” (2008) 118 Yale Law 
Journal 320 at 328. 
69 Wikileaks “About” (7 May 2011) <https://wikileaks.org/About.html> 
70 Jo Tuckman “Whistleblowers wanted: Mexican journalists seek tips through website” The Guardian 
(online ed, 16 March 2015) - Mexicoleaks, for example, is a digital platform which promises anonymity to 
its sources and is extensively relied upon by Mexican journalists and activists seeking to expose corruption 
in their country.  
71 Grant Huscroft “Freedom of expression” in Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican and Richard 
Mahoney (eds) The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) at 311. 
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by transforming users into active speakers rather than passive recipients of information.72 
Explicit engagement with the Internet under the cover of anonymity may be the only 
secure way for individuals to explore and assert aspects of their identity including gender, 
sexuality, religion, cultural belonging and national origin.73 The Special Rapporteur 
identified anonymity as a “leading vehicle for online security” by enabling individuals to 
exercise their right to freedom of expression without interference.74 Digital technologies 
create an unprecedented capacity for interference with the right to freedom of expression 
with censorship and data collection forcing individual online users to seek secure ways 
to freely express their opinions.75 The United States Supreme Court has noted that 
identification requirements for engaging with speech are intrusive on the rights of the 
author to determine their own identity through self-expression.76 In response many 
anonymous virtual spaces have developed online which enable an author to engage with 
a chosen audience, controlling the identifying information revealed and free from the 
scrutiny of both governments and societal norms.77 
 
Many groups of Internet users have a legitimate need to hide their identity. Anonymity 
online offers protection for vulnerable individuals who seek to join supportive online 
communities without their personal identity being revealed. 78 Women’s Refuge in New 
Zealand provides victims of domestic violence advice for steps they can take to seek help 
  
72 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, above n 52, at [11]. 
73 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, above n 52, at [12]. 
74 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, above n 52, at [1]. 
75 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, above n 52, at [1]. 
76 McIntyre, above n 1, at 355 – intrusive because they require authors to reveal “the content of [their] 
thoughts on a controversial issue” p. 1543, Lidksy and Cotter 
77 Marc Trabsky, Julian Thomas, Megan Richardson “The faulty door of cyberspace and implications for 
privacy law” (2013) 1 Law in Context 13 at 16. 
78 Citron, above n 4, at 239. 
  
 
13 
 
from their services without being identifiable online.79  The ability to remain hidden from 
identification is also fundamentally important for activists and journalists. The Tor 
network (The Onion Router) which is widely used internationally by journalists and 
activists offers anonymity by encrypting web traffic and masking IP addresses.80 In its 
mission statement the project claims to “advance human rights and freedoms” by 
supporting an unrestricted availability of online anonymity.81 The network is used by 
individuals wanting to protect their sources or those who endeavour to engage in 
whistleblowing activities while freely maintaining the privacy of their communications 
to avoid censorship.82 A threat or compulsion for an anonymous online speaker to 
disclose their identity may inhibit the willingness of such individuals to contribute to 
public discourse by providing information and, in extreme cases, may put them at risk of 
persecution.83 
 
When defining the scope of protection afforded by s 14 of the Bill of Rights in the context 
of a disclosure order under the HDCA, the Courts should therefore consider the extent to 
which anonymous online speech in a particular circumstance upholds free speech 
rationales. 84 The value that anonymity grants to the content of speech, rather than the 
status of the speaker, is a key factor in upholding free speech values.85 The capacity for 
an Internet user to disguise their identity and ‘digital footprint’ empowers individuals to 
freely share opinions and information as well as access the views of others.86 87 An 
analysis of the free speech value of anonymous online speech will assist the court in 
  
79 Women’s Refuge “Hide my Visit” (10 August 2015) <https://womensrefuge.org.nz/WR/Legal/Internet-
Safety> 
80 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, above n 52, at [9]. 
81 Tor “About Tor” (17 May 2015) <https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en> 
82 James Ball, Bruce Schneier and Glenn Greenwald “NSA and GCHQ target Tor network that protects 
anonymity of web users” The Guardian (online ed, 4 October 2013). 
83 Gleicher, above n 68, at 331. 
84 Huscroft, above n 71, at 311.  
85 Lidsky, above n 65, at 894. 
86 Trabsky, Thomas and Richardson, above n 77, at 3. 
87 Trabsky, Thomas and Richardson, above n 77, at 7; Lidsky, above n 65, at 894. 
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effectively and consistently balancing the right to freedom of expression against any 
competing legal interests involved which call for disclosure.  
 
B Rationales for restriction 
 
Having demonstrated that anonymous online speech can fulfill the rationales for a right 
to freedom of expression, there must be valid reasons for its restriction. 88 The 
predominant rationale for restricting anonymous online speech is accountability. Online 
anonymity is identified by the Law Commission as a dimension of the Internet which 
exacerbates the harm of damaging online behaviour by endowing the abuser with a sense 
of being shielded from the “real-life consequences” of their actions.89 This effect is 
described by social psychologists as "deindividuation", where the likelihood of 
destructive behaviour is increased because individuals are distanced from the effects of 
their actions by the virtual nature of the technology and avoidance of identification.90 The 
open format of the Internet has made the adoption of multiple anonymous identities or 
profiles a common feature of online discussions.91 By threatening the removal of the 
security afforded by anonymity, if such protection of identity is misused, a disclosure 
order effectively erodes what Justice David Harvey describes as the ‘myth’ of anonymous 
immunity online.92 
 
The credibility of free speech arguments are significantly weakened by internet users who 
abuse their right to freedom of expression by causing harm to other users.93 For example 
the justification of truth is arguably lost when anonymity is used for abusive or indecent 
speech which contains no beneficial assertions of fact.94  Anonymity can also deprive an 
  
88 Huscroft, above n 71, at 311.  
89 Law Commission, above n 3, at 7.15. 
90 Citron, above n 4, at 58.  
91 Law Commission, above n 3, at 4.147.  
92 David Harvey Internet.law.nz (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [7.5.16]. 
93 Law Commission, above n 3, at 7.5. 
94 Nicol, Millar and Sharland, above n 58, at 3. 
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audience of information which has significant value, for example if the author of the 
harmful speech was an elected public official then the identity of the speaker may be of 
public interest.95 Measures of accountability are therefore seen as necessary in order to 
secure trust in the marketplace of ideas and further the search for truth by challenging 
speech which does not serve a social purpose.96 
 
The deterrent value of a disclosure order for an anonymous online author’s identity is a 
key justification for the legal mechanism.97 The underlying rationale is to undermine any 
encouragement anonymity may afford to further harmful communication.98 Honourable 
Amy Adams argues the disclosure orders by the District Court under the HDCA will 
change online behavior by sending a “clear message” to speakers online that there will 
be consequences for abusive material.99 The US Supreme Court has previously given 
significant weight to the rationale of restricting anonymous speech for the purposes of 
deterrence of harm, in the context of corrupt financial practices in electoral campaigns. 100 
The House of Lords in the United Kingdom has also held orders for disclosing the identity 
of anonymous sources are necessary on the basis of deterring wrong doing.101 
 
Online content hosts are already implementing measures to deter abusive behavior. For 
example in an effort to minimise abuse on its site Facebook adopted a real-name policy 
which requires users to register using their ‘authentic identity’. 102 The social media 
network claims this is necessary to foster a culture which deters users who are averse to 
  
95 Lyrissa Lidsky and Thomas Cotter “Authorship, Audiences and Anonymous Speech” (2006-2007) 82 
Notre Dame L. Rev 1532 at 1545; McIntyre, above n 1, the Supreme Court identified an author’s identity as 
content which contributes to the communicative value of that individual’s speech. 
96 Murchison, above n 5, at 193. 
97 Law Commission, above n 13, at 17; Law Commission, above n 3, at 7.124. 
98 Yee Fen Lim “Cyberspace Law: commentaries and materials” (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2002) 
at 294. 
99 (25 June 2015) 706 NZPD 4830. 
100 Lidsky and Cotter, above n 95, at 1552; McConnell v FEC 540 U.S. 93 (2003) at 143-44. 
101 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd  [2001] 1 All ER 991. 
102 Submission of Facebook (14 March 2012) at 5, cited in Law commission, above n 13, at 3.31. 
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using their real names or email addresses.103 For the shared purpose of deterring abuse, 
Twitter has recently implemented registration requirements for serial ‘trolls’ and has 
introduced a policy which forces users of the anonymous TOR network to register their 
phone numbers.104 
 
The legal interest of holding anonymous speakers accountable for speech of a low value 
such as cyber-harassment is an unalloyed good. In many applications for a disclosure 
order under the HDCA, accountability will clearly outweigh an individual’s right to 
freedom of expression. It is important however for the Court to recognize that these 
rationales sit in tension with an individual’s right to freedom of expression. In order for 
the HDCA to accommodate the diverse value of anonymous online speech, the court must 
engage with a balancing exercise under s 5 when making an order for identity disclosure. 
This will protect anonymous speech that meaningfully upholds free speech values. 
 
IV Informative experiences in anonymous speech regulation  
 
The following legal approaches developed with regards to the disclosure of anonymous 
speaker’s identities in New Zealand and abroad are informative for the application of the 
HDCA.  In this context anonymity has been recognized as an exercise of the right to 
freedom of expression and considerations taken into account to determine when the 
protection it affords is lost. 
A The United Kingdom: Norwich Pharmacal Orders 
 
The Norwich Pharmacal order is an equitable remedy developed by the House of Lords 
in the 1970s which compels a third party to disclose the identifying information of a 
wrongdoer. 105 The orders are increasingly being adapted in the United Kingdom to 
compel online content hosts to disclose the identities of anonymous online users without 
  
103 Submission of Facebook (14 March 2012) at 5, cited in Law commission, above n 13, at 3.31. 
104 Samuel Gibbs “Twitter’s new bid to end online abuse could endanger dissidents” the Guardian (online 
ed, 4 March 2015) - troll is internet slang for an internet user who is deliberately inflammatory. 
105 Norwich Pharmacal Co & Ors v Commissioners of Customs and Exercise [1973] 2 All ER 943. 
  
 
17 
 
these hosts attracting liability. For example in G & G v Wikimedia Foundation Inc, the 
court granted a Norwich Pharmacal order to disclose the identity of an anonymous user 
of Wikipedia who had allegedly posted private and confidential information about the 
claimant in a Wikipedia article.106 In Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael, 
Facebook was similarly compelled under an order to disclose the registration details, 
email addresses and IP addresses of the alleged respondent.107  
 
The orders are theoretically available as a legal avenue to unveil an anonymous online 
author’s identity in New Zealand and barrister John Katz observes in the context of 
intellectual property law that they are an effective course of action for obtaining the 
identity of offenders who seek protection behind contractual agreements with ISPs and 
other content hosts.108 There is however very little precedent of the remedy being used in 
New Zealand. 109 The Employment Court has previously issued a Norwich Pharmacal 
order under the guise of pre-commencement discovery law to an Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) for obtaining the identity of an anonymous account holder who was 
claimed to be the author of an offensive email.110 The judge observed that three 
conditions must be met before an order is made: first, there must have been a wrongful 
act, second, no action can commence against the wrongdoer without the discovery of the 
information and third, the third party was not involved in the wrongdoing.111 This case 
demonstrates however that Norwich Pharmacal orders will not be effective in the context 
of the HDCA because issues regarding the right to freedom of expression are not taken 
into account. 
 
Norwich Pharmacal orders have been questioned in terms of a lack of safeguards around 
the disclosure of an anonymous speaker’s identifying information which creates potential 
  
106 G & G v Wikimedia Foundation Inc [2009] EWHC 3148 (QB). 
107 Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB), [2008] Info TLR 318 (24 July 2008) 
108 John Katz, “Norwich Pharmacal Orders 35 Years On” 5 NZIPJ 610 (2010). 
109 John Katz, above n 108. 
110 A v The Internet Company of New Zealand [2009] ERNZ 1. 
111 A v The Internet Company of New Zealand at [9]. 
  
 
18 
 
difficulties, for example applicants may not have a direct legal interest in disclosure.112 
In the House of Lords decision British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd, Lord 
Templeman stated that the principle of Norwich Pharmacal applies “whether or not the 
victim intends to pursue action in the courts against the wrongdoer provided that the 
existence of a cause of action is established and the victim cannot otherwise obtain 
justice”.113 This approach was upheld in Totalise Plc v The Motley Fool Ltd where the 
court rejected the defendant’s argument that the discretion to order the disclosure of an 
identity should not be exercised unless the plaintiff had a clear intention to bring 
proceedings against the author.114 The court held Totalise had a right to know the identity 
of the author to then assess the best course of legal action.115 When applying for a 
Norwich Pharmacal order it is therefore not necessary for the plaintiff to plead a full 
statement of claim and the orders can be made simply to establish the viability of a cause 
of action, regardless of whether alternative options are available for obtaining the 
information.116 
 
Concerns have been expressed about the extent to which Norwich Pharmacal orders 
adequately take into account the competing legal interests which underlie an order to 
disclose a speaker’s identity.117 The orders have been criticized for failing to establish a 
threshold which protects an individual’s right to freedom of expression in circumstances 
where anonymous speech serves a public interest. 118 This is most notable in the context 
of journalist source protection. The House of Lords used a Norwich Pharmacal order in 
British Steel Corporation v Granada Television to compel a journalist to disclose the 
identity of their confidential source.119 The European Court of Human Rights held in 
  
112 James Tumbridge “Media CAT scratches the Norwich Pharmacal Order” (2011) Convergence 1 2011. 
113 British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 417 at 443. 
114 Totalise v Motely Fool Limited [2002] FSR 50.  
115 Harvey, above n 92, at 7.5.16. 
116 John Katz, above n 108. 
117 BMG Canada v John Doe and Jane Doe (2005) 252 DLR (4th) 342. 
118 Stuart Wallace, “the Journalist-source relationship in context: a comparative review of US and English 
Law” (2009) 38 Comm. L. World Rev. 268 at 273. 
119 British Steel Crpn v Granada Television Ltd, above n 113.  
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Financial Times Ltd v The United Kingdom that the use of a Norwich Pharmacal order 
for the disclosure of an anonymous source to journalists is incompatible with the right to 
freedom of expression embodied in Article 10 of the European Convention, which can 
only be restricted to the extent necessary to uphold a democratic society.120 The European 
Court directed that the factors taken into account must include whether there is 
sufficiently clear evidence to demonstrate that disclosure of an identity was necessary to 
prevent further dissemination of confidential information and to recover damages.121 
Prevention of a future breach was insufficient to warrant disclosure.122 In New Zealand, 
as discussed in the following section, it was observed in Police v Campbell involving the 
protection of journalist sources, that Norwich Pharmacal orders were an example of the 
common law falling short of protection.123 
 
Norwich Pharmacal orders should not be relied upon as an analogous precedent for 
disclosure orders made under the HDCA as they fail to adequately balance the competing 
legal interests involved. As the Ontario Court of Appeal has observed “the Norwich 
order…is an intrusive and extraordinary remedy that must be exercised with caution”.124 
  
  
120 Financial Times Ltd, above n 55 - the United Kingdom is party to the European Convention on Human 
Rights which is incorporated into domestic law in the Human Rights Act 1998 and has bound courts to apply 
law in a way which complies with its terms. 
121 Financial Times Ltd, above n 55. 
122 Goodwin v the United Kingdom, 27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II. 
123 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [50].  
124 GEA Group AG v Ventra Group Co 2009 ONCA 619. 
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B New Zealand: Journalist Source Protection 
 
The law surrounding the protection of journalist’s sources deals with issues concerning 
the disclosure of an otherwise anonymous speaker’s identity. Journalists hold a unique 
position when faced with a legal obligation that risks disclosure of the identity of a source 
which conflicts with their promise of anonymity to that source.125 This relationship 
between journalists and confidential sources is protected by statute under section 68 of 
the Evidence Act 2006 in recognition of the freedom of the press.126 Anonymous speech 
is a much broader category, valuable in vastly different ways depending on the context 
and the speaker. The process engaged with by the courts for regulating the disclosure of 
a speaker’s identity in this area of law has value for considering an application for an 
order to disclose an anonymous author’s identity under the HDCA, particularly in light 
of the Bill of Rights. 
 
The law presumes non-compulsion for journalists where, if confidentiality was promised 
to a source, there is a risk of disclosure of their identity.127 This protection is limited to 
the information which would disclose the identity of the source and does not extend to 
the content of the engagement between an informant and journalist.128 It is a qualified 
protection with courts empowered to ultimately compel journalists to reveal their sources 
when a greater public interest is identified in disclosure.129 The presumption of immunity 
can therefore be displaced by an order under s 68(2). 
 
The legislation requires the public interest in identifying a source be weighed against a 
likely “adverse effect” of disclosure of the individual’s identity and the competing 
  
125 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2010) at 
[13.4.1]. 
126 Wallace, above n 118, at 269.  
127 Section 68.  
128 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [84] 
129 Burrows and Cheer, above n 125, at [13.4.1]. 
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interest of the public knowing the information they communicated.130 Justice 
Randerson’s interim judgement in Police v Campbell is informative for its interpretation 
of the balancing exercise required of the court when considering an application for an 
order under s 68 (2).131 In this case the public interest in identifying the source was the 
investigation and prosecution of crime.132 This exercise involves weighing the competing 
legal interests involved in the particular case and considering the protection afforded to 
freedom of expression by s 14 of the Bill of Rights.  
 
Rather than a conventional discretionary exercise, this process was held to be an 
evaluation of fact and degree.133 The judge argued it would be adding a “gloss to the 
words of the statute” to establish a set threshold of unusual or exceptional circumstances 
for overriding the qualified protection.134 The balancing of different factors involved in 
an application was held to be sufficient. Factors taken into account in this assessment 
include whether alternative means of obtaining the information were available, the 
importance of the information for the prosecution’s case and the seriousness of the charge 
and the public interest in disclosure.135 The necessity of the informant’s identity to the 
prosecution’s case is considered alongside the mandatory factors in s 68 (2) and (5). 
These factors are similar to the considerations assessed in the United Kingdom.136  
After accepting evidence about the difficulty of empirically assessing a chilling effect on 
speech resulting from disclosure, the judge observed if there is a low threshold for a high 
frequency of court-ordered disclosures and the orders attract a high level of publicity, the 
greater the risk of a chilling effect.137 Academic Ursula Cheer observes that the European 
  
130 Evidence Act, s 68 (2) (a) and (b). 
131 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [89] Randerson J held the word “outweighs” indicates the Court must 
conduct a balancing exercise. 
132 At [72].  
133 At [90]. 
134 At [91]. 
135 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [96]-[99]. 
136 Ursula Cheer “Compelling Journalists To Disclose Sources: Two Recent Decisions from Europe and New 
Zealand” (2010) 2(1) Journal of Media Law 15-23 at 21. 
137 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [49].  
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Court of Human Rights gave greater weight to predictions about chilling effects in the 
same context.138  
 
While the Court is specifically required to consider the Bill of Rights when making an 
order to disclose an anonymous speaker’s identity under the HDCA, Police v Campbell 
only briefly considers the Bill of Rights.139 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer note that the 
case acknowledges s 14 as the presumptive starting point of the balancing exercise 
involved rather than a criterion to be taken into account.140 The same presumption should 
operate in the context of discovering the identity of an anonymous online speaker. Justice 
Randerson’s analysis of the balancing test required under s 68 is informative and valuable 
in the context of the HDCA in terms of the considerations that are taken into account 
when determining the appropriate weight that should be given to the legal interest in 
disclosure of an anonymous speaker’s identity. 
 
C The United States: John Doe Subpoenas 
 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution is often referred to in New 
Zealand when considering the scope of protection afforded by the right to freedom of 
expression.141 The Supreme Court of the United States has long established that the First 
Amendment encompasses a right to speak anonymously, observing that anonymous 
media such as books and political pamphlets have played “an important role in the 
progress of mankind”.142 Recently the question of whether and to what extent anonymous 
speech should be protected in the context of digital communications has gained greater 
urgency with an increase of applications for “John Doe” subpoenas to disclose 
  
138 Cheer, above n 136, at 19. 
139 Harmful Digital Communications Act, s 19 (6).  
140 Burrows and Cheer, above n 125, at [15.2.3]. 
141 Huscroft, above n 40, at 170. 
142 Talley v California 362 U.S. 60 (1960) at [3] 449.  
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anonymous speaker’s identities.143 This increase is partially attributable to the safe harbor 
provision in the Communications Decency Act which protects online content hosts and 
ISP’s from liability, meaning that claims can only be directly brought against the 
individual author of the harmful material online.144 In civil cases the identity of the author 
must also be determined for a successful legal claim. 145 American legal academic Lyrissa 
Lidsky observes that many recent claims for exposing the identity of an anonymous 
online speaker are purely symbolic, with the threat of exposure intended to silence other 
speakers or critics.146 A sizeable body of case law has emerged in the United States which 
grapples with the challenges these subpoenas pose to the fundamental right to freedom 
of expression. 
1 A balanced standard 
 
In the United States to date, no prevailing standard for the disclosure of an anonymous 
online speaker’s identity has been developed by a federal circuit court or the Supreme 
Court.147 In Solers, Inc v Doe it was observed that “one size does not necessarily fit all” 
for a test to expose anonymous speakers.148 A universal standard is difficult to establish 
because of the diversity of online anonymous speech.149 As a result a spectrum of legal 
standards for the discovery of anonymous online speaker’s identities has emerged.150 The 
emergence of such a variety of tests reflects the challenges faced when required to 
balance the legal interests involved in cases dealing with anonymous online speech.151  
 
  
143 Murchison, above n 5, at 187 - “John Doe” is a generic term used in the United States to name a party that 
cannot be identified in a legal action. 
144 Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C 230 (c)(1)(2006) 
145 Columbia Ins. Co v seescandy.com 185 F.R.D. 573, 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999)   
146 Lidsky, above n 65, at 860.  
147 Jocelyn Hanamirian “The Right to Remain Anonymous: Anonymous Speakers, Confidential Sources and 
the Public Good” (2011-2012) 35 Colum. J. L. & Arts 119 at 126. 
148 Solers v Doe 977 A.2d 941, 952 (D.C. 2009). 
149 Murchison, above n 5, at 190. 
150 Murchison, above n 5, at 187.  
151 Lidksy and Cotter, above n 95, at 1595.  
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A “John Doe” subpoena in this context raises two important questions, the first 
concerning the scope of First Amendment protection over anonymous online speech and 
the second concerning what requirements must be met for an application for a discovery 
order to be successful.152 There have been courts which do not consider anonymous 
online speech as deserving any protection.153 Most courts however have sought to 
develop a legal standard of disclosure which protects valuable anonymous speech yet 
simultaneously allows for measures of accountability.154 The standards most relevant to 
the application of the HDCA in New Zealand are those developed in the cases Dendrite 
International Inc v Doe155 and Doe v Cahill156 which directly deal with the task of 
balancing anonymous speech as an exercise of freedom of speech against providing 
individuals harmed by such speech with effective redress according to a constitutional 
framework.157 
 
(a) Dendrite International Inc v Doe: a balancing test  
 
Dendrite International Inc v Doe adopted and expanded the “motion to dismiss” standard, 
which required the plaintiff to provide notice to the defendant and demonstrate the 
application would survive a request by the defendant to dismiss the case, to include an 
explicit balancing test which assessed the strength of the plaintiff’s case against the value 
of preserving the defendant’s anonymity. 158 The case was considering allegedly 
defamatory anonymous comments posted on a Yahoo! Message board.  
 
Legal scholars in the United States are divided over the desirability of the Dendrite 
balancing test. Academics Lidsky and Cotter argue it is a necessary step to ensure the 
  
152 Doe v 2theMart.com, above n 53, at 1091.  
153 Lidsky and Cotter, above n 95, at 1595.  
154 Murchison, above n 5, at 190.  
155 Dendrite International v Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61. 
156 Doe v Cahill, above n 53. 
157 Sophia Qasir “Anonymity in Cyberspace: Judicial and Legislative Regulations” (2012-2013) 81 Fordham 
L. Rev. 3651 at 3680.  
158 Hanamirian, above n 147, at 124. 
  
 
25 
 
defendant’s right to speak anonymously is not readily compromised.159 Others argue the 
balance inherent in the good-faith standard is sufficient.160 Legal academic Brian 
Murchison argues the test is ‘unwise’ and fundamentally problematic because of the 
difficulty in calculating the value of anonymous speech in comparison with its harm and 
this ambiguity may dissuade plaintiffs from litigation.161 
 
(b) Doe v Cahill: a summary judgement standard  
 
This case is particularly notable because it was the first instance where a State Supreme 
Court considered the issue of preventing trivial claims which would chill speech.162 In 
this case a city councilman obtained a court order for the disclosure of an anonymous 
blogger’s identity for allegedly defamatory statements posted by the blogger on an 
internet blog. Upon being notified by the content host of the order, the defendant filed for 
a motion to prevent disclosure of his identity. After applying a good faith standard, 
whereby a subpoena is granted if the complainant demonstrates a good-faith belief the 
information is necessary for their claim, the judge rejected the request for a protective 
order.163 On appeal the Delaware Supreme Court reversed this decision on the grounds 
that the good faith standard was insufficiently protective of the blogger’s right to speak 
anonymously as protected by the First Amendment.164 Anonymous online speakers 
would not be protected against gratuitous lawsuits brought solely for symbolic 
purposes.165 The court observed that internet speech is often anonymous and while there 
are certain classes of anonymous speech which negate the entitlement to First 
  
159 Lidsky and Cotter, above n 95, at 1596.  
160 Michael S. Vogel, “Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: the Case against Hand-Wringing over Legal 
Standards” (2004) 83 Or. L. REV 795, 854-44 at 855. 
161 Murchison, above n 5, at 192. 
162 Doe v Cahill, above n 53, at 457. 
163 At 457. 
164 Doe v Cahill, above n 53, at 454. 
165 At 457. 
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Amendment protection there is an imperative to adopt a strict standard which would 
prevent any chill of online users exercising their right to speak anonymously.166 
 
The court proceeded to establish a demanding standard whereby the plaintiff is required 
to satisfy a “summary judgment” standard before the identity of an anonymous defendant 
can be obtained.167 This standard requires the plaintiff to: (1) provide the anonymous 
speaker with notice that disclosure of their identity is being sought and a reasonable 
opportunity to respond, and (2) demonstrate certainty in the material facts of the case and 
that the disclosure of the identity is necessary as a matter of law. The fact that this case 
involved political speech and a public figure was specifically taken into account in 
reaching this decision.168 An explicit balancing test, such as that adopted in Dendrite, 
was rejected on the basis that “the summary judgment test is itself the balance”.169  
 
2 Lessons for New Zealand 
 
In considering the applicability of the experience in the United States to New Zealand’s 
application of the HDCA, the balancing exercise in Dendrite, which Cahill builds from, 
is informative in a New Zealand context because the application of s 5 of the Bill of 
Rights involves a similar balancing exercise.170 Case law interpreting s 5 of the Bill of 
Rights overwhelmingly prefers a balancing approach with formulaic tests rejected on the 
basis of being unlikely to produce a predictable or certain result and difficult to apply in 
circumstances involving conflicting legal interests which vary from case to case.171 The 
standard in Doe v Cahill is increasingly being used by US courts on the grounds that it 
ensures protection of online anonymity against gratuitous claims and has been 
  
166 Doe v Cahill, above n 53, at 457. 
167 At 457. 
168 At 464. 
169 Dendrite, above n 155, at 461. 
170 Huscroft, above n 40, at 172. 
171 Huscroft, above n 40, at 174.  
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recommended as the standard which should be adopted by the government.172 Lidsky and 
Cotter argue that the standard in Doe v Cahill is a “good point of departure” for 
developing a uniform judicial legal framework.173 The decision is therefore important for 
the context of the HDCA for its endeavor to strike an appropriate balance between 
protecting anonymous speakers and providing access to justice for those harmed by 
anonymous speech.174  
 
  
  
172 Citron, above n 4, at 223. 
173 Lidsky and Cotter, above n 95, at 1596.  
174 Doe v Cahill, above n 53, at 465. 
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V Recommendations for a comprehensive legal approach: striking a balance 
 
To ensure orders for the disclosure of an anonymous online speaker’s identity under the 
HDCA are consistent with the Bill of Rights, the Court should adopt a legal approach 
which considers the scope of protection afforded by s 14 of the Bill of Rights to extend 
over anonymous online speech. The Court should then engage with a balancing exercise 
to determine whether a legal interest in disclosure outweighs this protection. 175 This 
approach would be consistent with judicial experience concerning disclosure orders in 
the context of journalist source protection in New Zealand, which has engaged with a 
similar balancing exercise, and in the United States where there is an increasing concern 
to engage with a contextual analysis of the desirability of a disclosure order to ensure 
anonymous online speech is protected in circumstances of value.  
 
A significant proportion of the speech which comes before the Court will not be worthy 
of protection however the presumption of protection ensures due weight is given to the 
right to freedom of expression by the Court when exercising its discretion and ensures 
valuable speech is not curtailed. A contextual analysis can be effective in both 
straightforward cases and those that require a higher threshold of protection when 
valuable speech is involved therefore the policy motivation of the HDCA to hold 
individuals accountable for their speech will not be undermined.176  In the context of 
journalist source protection, the New Zealand Supreme Court in Brooker v Police 
perceived the decision to disclose an anonymous source’s identity as circumstantial and 
based upon all relevant considerations in an individual case.177 The statutory 
considerations set out in s 19 (5) of the HDCA for the Court to take into account when 
exercising its discretion also appear to indicate a fact-specific approach is preferred in 
this context.178  
 
  
175 Huscroft, above n 40, at 172 
176 Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30, [2007] 3 NZLR 91 at [90]. 
177 Brooker v Police, above n 176, as per Richardson J at [59] and Tipping J at [91]. 
178 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [94].  
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A particular concern for the Courts interpreting s 68 (2) of the Evidence Act and the 
Courts in the United States was the potential for an insufficiently protective balancing 
process to chill valuable anonymous speech. The likelihood of a chilling effect could be 
considered when the court is assessing the degree to which an anonymous communication 
is in the public interest as required by s 19 (5) (g) of the HDCA.179 The High Court 
accepted evidence in Police v Campbell that if the frequency of court orders to disclose 
a speaker’s identity is low the risk of a chilling effect on anonymous speakers is 
diminished.180 The United States has however experienced a rise in applications for the 
disclosure of anonymous authors of digital communications after the implementation of 
section 230 (c) (1) which protects online content hosts from legal action and shifts 
liability to the individual internet user. 181  The introduction of a similar provision in the 
HDCA, coupled with the breadth of the communication principles and prevalence of 
anonymity online, creates a potential for applications for disclosure orders to be relatively 
high. The communication of information in the public interest, such as a wrongdoing by 
a public official, could be deterred by the threat of disclosure of the speaker’s identity. 182 
Anonymous online speakers could also censor their speech if disclosure of their 
identifying details would have a likely adverse effect on them, such as by revealing 
sensitive personal information.183   
 
The following considerations should also be taken into account for the court’s decisions 
to adequately consider whether a legal interest in disclosure rebuts the presumption of 
protection under s 14. The presence of s 20 in the HDCA which enables the court to vary 
an order appears to grant a discretion which extends beyond s 19 (5) to take into account 
other relevant factors.184 The current judicial climate in the United States indicates a 
growing consensus among the Courts that a John Doe subpoena requires providing notice 
  
179 Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015, s 19 (5)(g). 
180 At [114]. 
181 Laura Rogal “Anonymity in Social Media” (2013) 7 Phoenix Law Review 61 at 72. 
182 Doe v Cahill, above n 53, at 457. 
183 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [100]. 
184 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [102] – s 19 (2) “may, on an application” 
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to the defendant and a strong argument presented by the plaintiff.185 In Police v Campbell, 
Randerson J considered the significance of disclosing the speaker’s identity for the 
prosecution’s case alongside the required statutory criteria.186 This consideration is 
particularly salient in the context of the HDCA as alternative remedies are open to 
potential plaintiffs which may make a disclosure order unnecessary. 187 For example 
under the HDCA the content complained of may have already been taken down by an 
online content host under an order by the District Court.188 If the identifying details are 
of crucial importance to the prosecution case, then greater weight should be given to the 
legal interest in disclosure.189  In order to protect valuable speakers however, the court 
should adopt a legal approach which requires disclosure to be important to the plaintiff 
not merely desirable.190  
 
A balancing exercise which determines whether the legal interest in disclosure outweighs 
that of the individual’s right to freedom of expression would effectively respond to the 
spectrum of anonymous online speech that will be challenged before the District Court 
under the HDCA. This approach would ensure against valuable anonymous online speech 
being gratuitously curtailed while continuing to hold individuals who engage with speech 
of a low value to account. 
  
  
185 Gleicher, above n 68, at 339; Lidsky and Cotter, 1595. 
186 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [96]-[99]. 
187 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [97] – this was a factor taken into account. The take down of content 
can be ordered under s 19 (1) of HDCA. 
188 Harmful Digital Communications Act, s 19 (1) (a).  
189 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [97]. 
190 Police v Campbell, above n 45, at [97]. 
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VI  Conclusion 
 
The ubiquity and ease of anonymity online has become a fundamental feature of Internet 
discourse. Although frequently identified as a characteristic of digital communication 
which facilitates and encourages cyber-abuse, this paper demonstrates that speaking 
anonymously online is nevertheless an exercise of an individual’s fundamental right to 
freedom of expression. The security of anonymity can be utilized in meaningful ways, 
including the empowerment of ordinary individuals to voice their views and opinions on 
matters of public importance and to afford protection to vulnerable speakers.  
 
An order to disclose an anonymous online author’s identity under the HDCA is a measure 
intended to deter harmful digital communications by holding individuals accountable for 
their speech. The necessity of disclosure of the identity of an anonymous online speaker 
who has engaged in speech of a low societal value, such as harassment, is not questioned 
by this paper. The legislation is however structured around a broad set of principles which 
creates a high likelihood that the District Court will be required to consider applications 
for disclosure orders which involve core speech.  
 
The New Zealand courts must adopt a legal approach for granting the orders which 
adequately accounts for the diversity of anonymous online speech and recognizes that it 
attracts the protection of s 14 of the Bill of Rights as an exercise of an individual’s right 
to freedom of expression with the protection potentially lost when there is a greater 
interest in holding individuals accountable for any harm caused by the speech. A 
balancing exercise based upon an established set of considerations will ensure the law is 
consistently applied and that disclosure orders are a demonstrably justified limitation of 
this right to freedom of expression. When making an order the court is required to 
exercise its discretion according to the statutory criteria outlined in s 19 (5), however 
there are additional considerations that should be taken into account to determine whether 
and to what extent an anonymous speaker’s right to freedom of expression should be 
curtailed in light of other interests.  
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In light of the contemporary digital communications environment, the law should be 
cautious in its treatment of online anonymous speech and develop a framework that 
accounts for its diversity to ensure it is appropriately protected in circumstances of value. 
Anonymous online speech should not be exclusively considered in terms of the role it 
can have in spreading harm but should also be recognized for its potential to enrich 
society through empowering the means for sharing valuable information and facilitating 
acts of meaningful expression.   
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